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Written evidence submitted to the Communities and Local Government Inquiry on 
Overview and Scrutiny in Local Government 
By 
Dr Laurence Ferry, Durham University
1
 
9
th
 March 2017 
 
I welcome this opportunity to submit written evidence to the Communities and Local 
Government Inquiry on Overview and Scrutiny in Local Government. This reply draws on 
my personal senior level experience and recent published academic work on financial 
sustainability, accountability and transparency in central and local government.  
 
Overall, the main focus of my response concerns ‘Who is there to speak truth to power? - 
Local Accountability Arrangements for Public Money in a Post-Brexit World’. The scope of 
the response is confined to England, and it should be noted that there are some important 
differences in arrangements for other parts of the UK. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Overview and scrutiny arrangements for local government in England cannot be looked at in 
isolation, but must be considered in the broader context of devolution and the historic Brexit 
negotiations. 
 
In the expected context of Brexit where we are no longer automatically part of a protected EU 
market, there is an opportunity to rebalance the UK economy under a devolution agenda. This 
could provide a boost to the English regions in particular as ‘Integrated and Sustainable 
Cities’. 
  
In rebalancing the UK economy, the regions must play a crucial role in Brexit and help make 
a success of it. Under an industrial strategy the regions can be drivers of economic growth. 
Lord Michael Heseltine’s (2012) report ‘no stone unturned’ had already convinced 
government of the necessity to drive growth in the regions, but Brexit provides an external 
and unexpected shock that can fire a serious change. Indeed most of our main cities, with the 
exception of Hull, have their biggest trading partner in the EU and so stimulus in the regions 
to not only attempt and maintain EU markets but also to better develop world markets is a 
pressing issue (Bounds and Tighe, 2017). At the same time the regions can help to address 
issues for a fairer society and repair the bonds of social cohesion (Ferry, 2016a). The Prime 
Minister Theresa May has stated her absolute commitment to continuing the devolution 
revolution that began in 2010, but momentum has slowed (Hunter, 2017).  
 
Following Brexit the public services must be given the powers and resources to support the 
industrial strategy across the diverse regions of the UK. As a result, the government itself will 
inevitably grow as roles currently carried out in the EU will now need to be undertaken here 
in the UK, and local government will become more intertwined in supporting economic 
growth (Ferry and Eckersley, 2017).  
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Under these changes, new regional institutions and forms of accountability, overview and 
scrutiny will be necessary. Important questions have been raised around ‘Who is there to 
speak truth to power?’ and ‘What local arrangements should we have to oversee all these 
devolved funds?’ (Hillier, 2016a). 
 
This response considers potential local accountability arrangements for public money. More 
specifically, it will discuss the desire for each area to have its own ‘Local Public Accounts 
Committee’ (LPAC) for ‘place based accountability’, and the issues involved. The take away 
messages of the response relate to how public accountability is not currently appropriate to 
assure Value for Money (VfM), and that LPACs can provide a ‘strong’ means to address this 
situation in terms of not only looking at financial sustainability but also service performance. 
In addition, the local nature of these arrangements will help ensure governance is not merely 
about structures, but also the culture and context. The response sets out potential ways that 
LPACs could be implemented, and alternatives, including issues that should be considered in 
determining arrangements and implementation. The ultimate benefit to citizens is stronger 
accountability and scrutiny of public expenditure and revenue raising assuring VfM for 
taxpayer pounds. Furthermore, it seeks to ensure increased devolved funding and risks around 
Brexit can be managed at the local level for both economic growth and social cohesion. 
 
The response therefore sets out the background to overview and scrutiny arrangements, main 
models of overview and scrutiny, and ten key points. 
 
2. Background to Overview and Scrutiny Arrangements  
 
Traditionally, all local authorities in the UK employed a ‘committee system’ to make 
decisions, which involved meetings of the full council and/or committees managing one or 
more council services or departments.  
 
The Local Government Act 2000 replaced the committee system for English (and Welsh) 
local authorities with ‘overview and scrutiny’ arrangements. This meant adopting political 
management systems with a separate executive as a way of countering increasing decision-
making powers of leaders and Cabinets or directly elected mayors. Department for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG) (2001) guidance suggested all local authorities 
(except smallest) have more than one overview and scrutiny committee, which meet 
regularly. 
 
Since then overview and scrutiny arrangements have been subject of much criticism. Many 
councillors perceived they had less decision making involvement relative to the committee 
system, and the government was now more interested in the executive role than an overview 
and scrutiny checking and reviewing function. In contrast it was suggested obstacles to 
scrutiny may come from both senior officers and members, arising not necessarily from overt 
political behaviour but culture (Centre for Public Scrutiny (CfPS), 2015a).   
 
Also whilst overview and scrutiny committees can hold inquiries, produce reports and require 
council executive members and officers to appear before them, individuals from outside the 
council can be invited but not compelled to attend. Overview and scrutiny reports must 
receive a response from council executive within two months, but cannot oblige executive, 
council or external bodies to act upon their findings. Each authority must appoint at least one 
scrutiny officer, but Local Government Act 2000 made no provision for dedicated staff and 
financial resources for overview and scrutiny role and the scrutiny officer does not even need 
to be a dedicated post, and may be combined with other responsibilities. For example with 
regards to capacity a CfPS annual survey found average number of FTE officer posts for 
municipal year 2014/15 was 1.87 that was above the predicted average, but in contrast for the 
eighth year running the dedicated average scrutiny budget fell to merely £3,277 for 2014/15 
(CfPS, 2015b).  
 
In addition there are issues of political balance, role with partners and separation of the role 
of councillors. For example, the political balance of the local authority does not have to be 
taken into account when allocating chairs of overview and scrutiny committees in England. It 
is therefore unsurprising a CfPS survey found in 65% of respondent councils all scrutiny 
chair positions were held by majority party (CfPS, 2015c). In terms of partners, in England 
the Secretary of State can make regulations obliging provision of information to an overview 
and scrutiny committee by a relevant partner authority that may also be required to have 
regard to a report by the committee, which accords with powers around community strategies 
under Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007. With regards to 
separation on the role of councillors there have been past proposals for executive members to 
sit on overview and scrutiny committees during external scrutiny. However, whilst raised, 
this proposal has not got through House of Commons and was criticised by CfPS (2009) who 
suggest the Local Government Act 2000 established a clear separation of roles for councillors 
and should not be blurred in that there should not be direct involvement of executive 
councillors in scrutiny process, other than providing information and evidence as part of 
scrutiny reviews and responding to recommendations. 
 
Furthermore there have been many challenges to robustness of arrangements, especially 
following high profile cases. Recently these cases have unfortunately included the need for 
government intervention in local authorities following governance failings in Tower Hamlets 
and child sexual exploitation in Rotherham (CLG Select Committee Report, 2016), where 
culture was also a paramount consideration (Ferry, 2016b, 2016c). Earlier challenges have 
also been in other parts of the public service such as high mortality rates at Mid Staffordshire 
NHS Foundation Trust (Commons Select Committee, 2013).  
 
To combat criticisms there have been ways put forward to strengthen the overview and 
scrutiny committees. For example, Wilson and Game (2011) state three conditions. Firstly, 
new skills to draw out evidence from witnesses and understand financial and performance 
data. Secondly, councillors have to learn how to work together across party divides. Thirdly, 
a dedicated officer and resource support are deemed crucial. 
 
For England (the focus of this response), the main provisions can now be found in schedule 2 
of the Localism Act 2011. This mostly consolidated previously existing law, which built on 
the original legislation for overview and scrutiny in the Local Government Act 2000. 
 
Importantly the Localism Act 2011 made it possible for all councils to adopt a committee 
system of governance (from only district councils in England and Wales with a population of 
less than 85,000 under the Local Government Act 2000), and as a result some councils have 
re-adopted the committee system.  
 
Following the Localism Act 2011 a number of fundamental changes took place. In particular, 
the Audit Commission abolition and scrapping of centralised performance management 
systems means there are currently limited institutional arrangements for assessing local VfM 
(Ferry, Eckersley and Zakaria, 2015). Sector Led Improvement regimes have merits as well 
as weaknesses dependent upon context and policy priorities, just like centralised performance 
management regimes (Bennett, Allen, Grace, and Martin, 2014; Downe, Martin, and Doring, 
2014; Ferry, Eckersley and Zakaria, 2015; Local Government Association (LGA), 2015; 
Murphy and Jones, 2016), but it is arguable that there should be greater emphasis on more 
appropriate levels of public assurance than is currently the case (Ferry and Murphy, 2015, 
2017; Murphy and Jones, 2016). The focus has been financial conformance rather than 
operational performance (Ferry and Eckersley, 2015). Central government relies on the 
system of local accountability for assurance over the VfM of funding it gives local 
authorities. The DCLG’s core principles state that local authorities’ prime accountability is to 
their local electorate, and that local councillors are best placed to decide what is VfM locally 
(Ferry and Murphy, 2015a, 2015b).  
 
To complicate matters further the public service accountability landscape has become more 
diverse with decentralisation leading to creation of combined authorities that are required to 
establish overview and scrutiny committees by the Cities and Local Government Devolution 
Act 2016. However, scrutiny systems established by combined authorities have struggled for 
relevance and effectiveness, and not engaged consistently with local scrutiny with a risk 
scrutiny is perceived as a bolt-on to governance than an integral element (CfPS, 2016b).  
 
Devolution however has begun to stall, and Hunter (2017) at the Institute for Public Policy 
Research (IPPR) in looking at how to re-boot devolution highlights the importance of 
geography in terms of what is the right scale for devolution, and the importance of a shared 
sense of place and history to ground the devolution. This points to the importance of context, 
culture and emotions inherent in the historical and geographical underpinnings of 
contemporary practices of accounting and accountability arrangements (Ahrens and Ferry, 
2015, 2016; Ferry, Coombs and Eckersley, 2017). Indeed, similar evidence from previous 
local government reorganisation again directs the attention of how local identities and the 
way people carry out their lives must be reflected in administrative boundaries (Swann, 
2016). Existing institutions and a common sense of belonging are therefore important for a 
devolution area to provide that bond for partnership working and the public imagination. To 
date, disagreements over governance have complicated negotiations, with proposals about the 
suitability of government’s preferred structural model (a combined authority with directly 
elected mayor) for the local area not been met with open arms. Plans for managing the new 
arrangements for those areas involved with Mayoral elections in 2017 highlights the 
requirement for collaborative working and the  importance of scrutiny in managing 
governance uncertainty of collaborative decision-making could be achieved through LPACs 
(CfPS, 2016b). 
 
Hunter (2017) further identifies four stages for development of devolution deals to achieve a 
more successful approach with some elements already in place, including the open-ended 
cities and local government devolution bill, ability for local areas to develop a proposal for 
their context, and acceptance devolution will be asymmetrical. Nevertheless, he also suggests 
the Government’s approach to devolution requires clarity of purpose, process and timescale 
for devolution deal-making, and a willingness for greater decentralisation. 
 
Whatever the situation with the development of devolution, given that the trajectory is for 
services to be increasingly devolved to local areas there are concerns of a gap in VfM 
scrutiny (Ferry and Murphy, 2017). For example MP Meg Hillier (2016b), Chair of the 
national Public Accounts Committee (PAC), recently highlighted in October 2016 that select 
committees and local government scrutiny similarly face problems of scrutinising against the 
context of public spending cuts, increased demand and Brexit. She thereby called for a ‘whole 
system view’ of how to continue effectively scrutinising public services spend. In particular, 
she stated that given more devolution it was necessary for the PAC to consider where 
accountability rests regarding devolution. She also suggested parliament, local government 
and the public must be absolutely assured devolved spending was subject to effective scrutiny 
and there were clear lines of accountability for delivering VfM. In addition, she advocated 
that new governance and scrutiny arrangements arising from devolution must complement 
and not further complicate what already exists. Whilst all of this is imminently sensible, it 
could even be taken further as consideration may need to be given to a complete overhaul of 
the funding, accountability and scrutiny arrangements to take account of the implications of 
devolution and Brexit rather than attempting to complement the existing arrangements which 
arguably no longer appear fit for purpose (Ferry, 2016; Ferry and Murphy, 2017).     
 
With the abolition of the Audit Commission, the National Audit Office has become the main 
professional body examining public expenditure to ensure VfM, but while they look at sector-
wide issues they cannot assess whether individual local authorities are achieving VfM (Ferry 
and Murphy, 2015a, 2015b, 2017; NAO, 2014).  
 
MP Meg Hillier (2016a) recently highlighted in December 2016 that this raises a significant 
issue of who is there to speak truth to power? Public value is best determined by citizens and 
their local representatives, but if so what local arrangements should we have to oversee all 
these devolved funds. Should each area have its own LPAC for example?  
 
3. Overview and Scrutiny Models 
 
Over recent years several overview and scrutiny governance models have emerged, ranging 
from the ‘LPAC’ model at one end of the spectrum to the traditional model at the opposite 
(CfPS, 2016a). 
 
In 2008 the New Labour Government published a White Paper entitled Communities in 
Control, and following announcements it was clear there was an ambition to raise the profile 
of local government overview and scrutiny committees to something similar to the select 
committees system at national level and for broader powers so they could get information 
from partners (DCLG, 2008), but the Bill did not pass into law.  
 
Nevertheless, following the Localism Act 2011 much debate concerned devolution of power 
and funding to local government and place-based joint working arrangements.  
 
The CfPS (2013, 2015a, 2016a) proposed the creation of a powerful and independent LPAC 
for every place, which had a number of benefits for place based accountability. A LPAC 
would mean a move from merely ‘tiers’ to ‘spheres’ of accountability (Crowe, 2015). 
Operationally it would be similar to the national PAC for scrutinising public expenditure. 
However, responsibility would come from local partner agreement and/or legislative powers 
for place based scrutiny examining public value, spending and revenue-raising in a given area 
to hold to account their officers, elected members and contractors. The LPAC’s principal 
focus would be the VfM achieved by combined spending of public money in the local area, 
with emphasis on assessing whether planned outcomes are being achieved through 
partnership working and pooled or joint budgets agreed under place based finance 
arrangements.  
 
Potential benefits included reassuring central government devolved finance would be 
properly scrutinised and accounted for, stronger accountability for partnerships with a single 
and visible place for the public to find out how money was spent and challenge outcomes, 
and more opportunities for public engagement as publication of expenditure over a set limit 
(Originally £500) tells you what money was spent but not the outcome and VfM that requires 
context and analytical understanding. Benefits also included an ability for the LPAC to be 
able to refer matters up to the national PAC and NAO if systemic or national issues emerge 
or for them to draw on local evidence and vice versa as part of horizontal information 
sharing, especially around systemic and/or national issues that may emerge. In addition, local 
governance and accountability could be streamlined across partnership working, and there 
could be added value from external audit procurement by getting them to support LPACs in 
corporate governance and provide VfM analysis. Furthermore, there is a potential to link 
governance and financial accountability of partnership arrangements more closely (CfPS, 
2013).  
 
Power of a LPAC had three main considerations. Firstly,  right of access to any papers / 
information held by anybody involved in delivering public services with representatives to 
attend meetings as required to give evidence, (Those covered by this right would mirror the 
FOI Act definition around ‘delivering functions of a public nature’). Secondly, ‘enter and 
view’ power over any organisation delivering publicly funded services, (using the same 
definition) - a right to access real-time management information, managers and service users. 
Thirdly, power on the basis of the evidence to make recommendations to which the 
commissioner / provider would be obliged to respond with  acceptance of the 
recommendations and an action plan or if not accepted giving reasons why not. The LPAC 
would have the right to refer any refusal to implement a recommendation they regard as 
crucial for good governance and VfM to the national PAC for determination or further 
investigation. 
 
It is considered LPACs could cover areas of combined authorities or upper-tier authorities, 
have a separate legal personality, and be funded by a precept to cover staffing costs. A 
councillor would chair the LPAC, and a majority of members would be councillors, with 
others drawn from non-executives from relevant partner bodies, with possibly members of 
the public. CfPs (2013) suggested that MP’s could play a role within the LPAC’s. The 
establishment of overview and scrutiny committees by combined authorities has since 
become a requirement of the Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016, consisting 
of a majority of non-executive councillors from member councils of the combined authority 
and it must appoint at least one scrutiny officer. Members of the combined authority cannot 
sit on the committee The committee will have power to compel members and officers of the 
combined authority to attend meetings and answer questions, including the elected mayor if 
there is one. In these cases a framework may already be in place that a LPAC could build 
upon. 
 
However, the LPAC may not have the expertise to call upon as austerity has fundamentally 
challenged governance relationships by resulting in the loss of performance management 
information that could be benchmarked between councils, national studies such as those the 
Audit Commission carried out and research capacity at the DCLG. This has not been replaced 
by informal arrangements (Ferry and Murphy, 2015a, 2015b). Following the first wave of 
city deals, Meg Hillier (2015) expressed her disappointment that there is no effective 
mechanism for comparing results in different cities, nor to scrutinise knock-on effects 
projects in one area might have elsewhere. 
 LPACs would therefore need to establish professional support through use of auditors and 
other powers, as highlighted by the CfPS. As mentioned, these include being able to request 
people and papers from any institution spending public funds, the ability to refer matters to 
parliament where systemic risks are identified and the power to enter premises for evidence 
gathering. 
 
Universities could also partly step in to breach this gap, although they would certainly not be 
a panacea for a professionalised audit service. Nevertheless, universities are now required by 
the Research Excellence Framework, the system for assessing the quality of research in 
higher education institutions, to produce case studies demonstrating their impact beyond their 
ivory towers, and researching the VfM that councils present and reporting findings to say 
LPACs could help provide these impact case studies.  
 
In addition, it has been suggested that central government seems to have inconsistent 
expectations around geography, and of the sense of scale required for a deal to be viable 
(CfPS, 2016a). 
 
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the traditional overview and scrutiny committee 
model. Here, a committee meets bi-monthly or quarterly, discussing officer reports and 
updating on areas of interest. This model risks giving a perception of scrutiny without any 
real substance and action. However, the biggest concern is that this model is cheaper and 
given the current financial challenges it may see the path of least resistance between partners. 
 
In between these there are single and multiple overview and scrutiny committee models. The 
single model places the combined authority at the centre. This combined authority may co-
ordinate and commission work for councils to deliver, bring together separate scrutiny 
activity by councils through a joint committee, and commission short time limited reviews of 
combined authority business. This model, however, raises concerns around sovereignty and 
subsidiarity, and resource issues challenge the viability of traditional in-depth tasks. The 
multiple model has more than one overview and scrutiny committee at combined authority 
level, which mirrors local council arrangements. This overcomes concerns a single committee 
will not adequately scrutinise the broad spread of combined authority business, but at the 
same time it will be much more resource intensive and may even be unnecessary if the focus 
of the combined authority is as a strategic entity. 
 
While the LPAC model has much to commend it, this would be more expensive to operate 
and a balance would have to be struck. Structures are important because they can encourage 
people to behave in certain ways, but there is no exact one-size-fits-all model for scrutiny and 
governance. 
 
It is therefore also crucially important that structures are adaptable enough to take account of 
the ‘culture’ of each place with regards to budgetary stewardship, performance improvement, 
transformation or governance concerns at different times and the ‘context’ surrounding 
capacity, capability and other issues (Ahrens and Ferry, 2015, 2016). Indeed whilst local 
responsibility needs an overhaul, there is also a need to overhaul the funding arrangements 
for local government and detailed rules surrounding the use of funds that determines much of 
the power in central and local government relations (Ferry, Eckersley and van Dooren, 2015; 
Ferry, Coombs and Eckersley, 2017). Otherwise the whole process could be doomed to 
failure – A message the Layfield Committee alluded to over four decades ago (Johnstone, 
2016). 
 
It is with regard to governance and scrutiny of local government that research suggests local 
accountability will play a crucial part not only due to Brexit and the industrial strategy but 
increased devolved funding and revenue raising powers, increased privatisation of services 
and funding pressures (Ferry, 2017a, 2017b; Ferry and Eckersley, 2017).  
  
 4. Ten Key Points 
 
With regards to public accountability in general, and more specifically overview and scrutiny, 
the following ‘ten key points’ summarise the arguments being put forward in this response: 
 
1) Since 2010 in general the levels of both accountability and scrutiny have reduced 
significantly.  
 
2) The robustness of the hierarchical system of accountability has been weakened due to 
various factors. This includes the Audit Commission being abolished and centralised 
performance management system scrapped. The NAO took on financial conformance audit 
responsibilities and oversee local government VfM in general reporting to the PAC, but can’t 
assure individual local authority VfM. In addition, the levels of devolved funding have 
increased with localism, service delivery has fragmented and outsourcing extended 
significantly making it more challenging for providing an assurance through a hierarchical 
system. 
 
3) Public accountability arrangements in local government are not appropriate to assure 
VfM, and have instead focussed on ensuring the statutory imperative for a balanced budget. 
This focus on cost management has meant a systemic risk to certain services. For example the 
challenges in adult services in local government, and implications for the NHS services and 
budget that has no statutory requirement to be balanced, were visibly signposted as risks 
before they materialised. 
 
4) Within the broader framework of accountability, scrutiny committees are the 
Cinderella service that will not go to the ball. It is not seen as glamorous and councillors do 
not line up to serve on such committees. They have very limited resources i.e. funding and 
expertise. In addition, they have limited power to get people to come along to provide 
evidence and no power to make them change things. These problems are compounded 
regarding those people from outside their organisation, i.e. private sector contractors, who 
can evade relative levels of scrutiny. 
 
5) A potential solution is that each area could have its own LPAC for ‘place based 
accountability’. There would be a move from ‘tiers’ to ‘spheres’ of accountability. The 
emphasis would be on place based accountability rather than hierarchical levels of 
accountability per se, although there would still be an inherent capability to trace a pound of 
taxpayers’ money on a hierarchical basis with an ability to request downwards information 
and report systemic risks upwards through the system, and for LPACs to request national 
information for say benchmarking purposes. Whilst obviously not Comprehensive Area 
Assessment (CAA) as a formal audited performance management framework, this 
nonetheless resonates with area assessment mechanisms. 
  
6) LPACs cannot merely look at financial sustainability but also service performance.  
 
7) The local nature of these arrangements will help ensure governance is not merely 
about structures, but also the culture and context.  
 
8) Ultimate benefit to citizens is for a stronger accountability and scrutiny of public 
expenditure and revenue raising assuring VfM for taxpayer pounds. 
 9) It seeks to ensure that the risks from more devolved funding and Brexit can be 
managed at the local level for both economic growth and social cohesion. 
 
10) The problem is however that even if LPACs are supported with expertise and funding 
they will still need wide ranging powers concerning access, enter and view, and to use the 
evidence to make recommendations that could be politically difficult to bestow upon them 
and make operational. 
 
5. Summary 
 
In summary, the current landscape for public service accountability is not fit for purpose and 
especially given devolved funding and implications of Brexit.  
 
Overview and scrutiny committees therefore need bolstered, and/or consideration given to a 
new system embracing a whole system view.  
 
LPACs afford a means of ‘place based accountability’ that is attractive, but they would need 
proper powers and resources if they were also not to become a Cinderella service like 
existing overview and scrutiny arrangements. 
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